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Abstract—Zcash is a fork of Bitcoin with optional anonymity
features. While transparent transactions are fully linkable,
shielded transactions use zero-knowledge proofs to obscure the
parties and amounts of the transactions. First, we observe various
metrics regarding the usage of shielded addresses. Moreover, we
show that most coins sent to shielded addresses are later sent
back to transparent addresses. We then search for round-trip
transactions, where the same, or nearly the same number of
coins are sent from a transparent address, to a shielded address,
and back again to a transparent address. We argue that such
behavior exhibits high linkability, especially when they occur
nearby temporally. Using this heuristic our analysis matched
31.5% of all coins sent to shielded addresses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Zcash is a cryptocurrency which provides a mechanism
to obscure the source, destination, and amounts of trans-
actions. These transactions are known as shielded transac-
tions. The privacy of shielded transactions is achieved by
using zk-SNARKs, which are a type of zero-knowledge proof
[BSCG+14].
The use of shielded transactions is optional. As with Bitcoin,
Zcash coins are sent to addresses, which can be thought of as
public keys. Only the owner of the corresponding private key
can generate a new transaction to transfer the coins. In Zcash
there are two classes of addresses: transparent and shielded.
When a transaction occurs between transparent addresses the
transfer is akin to Bitcoin transactions, where the parties
involved and the amounts are fully visible. Only when a
transaction occurs between two shielded addresses are Zcash’s
privacy guarantees in full effect.
Generating shielded transactions comes at a significant
computational cost, taking between thirty seconds and one
minute to create on a modern desktop computer. Perhaps be-
cause of this, most Zcash transactions do not involve shielded
addresses. In Section III we quantify this, finding that only
about 3.5% of all Zcash coins are controlled by shielded
addresses on average.
Many transactions involving shielded addresses exhibit a
particular pattern: first, coins are sent from a transparent
address to a shielded address. Soon after, an identical or
nearly identical amount of coins are sent back to a transparent
address. We call such transactions round-trip transactions and
argue that the controlling party is likely the same for both
transactions. In Section IV, we show that 31.5%1 of all coins
sent to shielded addresses are likely involved in a round-trip
transaction, potentially removing their unlinkability. Lastly, we
discuss these results in Section V.
1All statistics in this paper were calculated on the Zcash blockchain ending
in block 196304, which was mined on October 4, 2017
II. BACKGROUND
Zcash retains nearly all of the original Bitcoin functionality.
Transactions between transparent addresses (also known as
t-addrs) are essentially equivalent in form to Bitcoin trans-
actions. In Bitcoin, coins are transferred by referencing the
outputs of previous transactions and providing a digital signa-
ture that proves ownership of the address the coins were sent
to. Since coins are only created as part of the block reward
for miners, it is straightforward to audit the correctness of
every transaction: simply trace back each transaction output,
verifying digital signatures along way back to a block reward.
However, the radical simplicity of Bitcoin’s transparent
ledger has significant privacy drawbacks. If an address is
ever associated with a real-world identity it becomes trivial
to trace the source and destination of all the user’s coins.
This loss of privacy can be mitigated by never re-using the
same address, although even the original Bitcoin whitepaper
notes that linking will remain unavoidable [Nak09]. Several
studies of the anonymitity of Bitcoin have been undertaken,
showing that analysis can overcome even a dedicated effort
at obfuscation [RH11], [MPJ+13]. Thus, when transferring
between two t-addrs in Zcash, the transaction is fully linkable.
Unlike Bitcoin, Zcash uses a second type of address known
as shielded addresses (also known as z-addrs). Transactions
involving z-addrs are carried out in the JoinSplit structure,
which is a new structure added to the Bitcoin transaction
format. A JoinSplit contains three essential fields: the number
of coins entering the shielded pool (known as vpub_old),
the number of coins exiting the shielded pool (known as
vpub_new), and a field holding a zero-knowledge proof
attesting to the legitimacy of the transaction.
There are three different operations that a JoinSplit may per-
form (see Figure 1). The first is a shielding transaction, where
coins are sent from a t-addr to a z-addr. This corresponds with
a non-zero vpub_old. Thus, in shielding transactions the
amount being sent to a z-addr is public, but the z-addr itself is
not. The second operation is a de-shielding transaction, where
coins are sent from a z-addr to a t-addr. This corresponds with
a non-zero vpub_new. Likewise, the z-addr remains private
but the amount is public. The final operation is a shielded
transaction, where coins are transferred between two z-addrs.
For shielded transactions both addresses are private, as well
as the amounts.
III. SHIELDED TRANSACTIONS
The anonymity of z-addrs is the fundamental differentiator
between Zcash and Bitcoin. We examine several metrics of
this anonymity as it pertains to real-world usage of Zcash.
Fig. 1. The three types of operations performed by a JoinSplit
Shielding De-shielding Shielded
Source t-addr z-addr z-addr
Destination z-addr t-addr z-addr
Amount Public Public Private
A. Transaction metrics
Fig. 2. The distribution of the percentage of transactions in each block that
contain at least one JoinSplit
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Overall, 19.6% (259,220) of all Zcash transactions con-
tained a JoinSplit operation, with 40.2% of blocks containing
no transactions with JoinSplits (see Figure 2). Thus, 80.4% of
all Zcash transactions are trivially linkable back at least one
transaction.
Of the 19.6% of transactions that do contain a JoinSplit, we
further classified the transactions into the types of JoinSplit
operations being performed. Every JoinSplit may contain an
unknown number of shielded transactions, so there is no
way to place an upper bound on the number of shielded
transactions. However, only 1.9% (5,450) of all JoinSplits have
no shielding or deshielding portion, while 40.6% (116,743) of
JoinSplits included a shielding operation and 57.5% (165,394)
included a deshielding operation2. This evidence supports our
eventual hypothesis that most coins sent to z-addrs are sent
back to t-addrs.
B. Coin metrics
We also investigated the participation of coins in shielded
transactions. As with Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, trans-
actions are grouped into blocks, and miners must solve a
difficult proof-of-work problem on the block and announce it
to the network. Valid blocks reward the miner with a certain
number of coins in what is known as the block reward. Thus,
with each block the available supply grows slightly, until some
fixed3 cap.
2No JoinSplit included both a shielding and a deshielding operation. It is
unclear if the Zcash software allows this
321 million for Bitcoin and Zcash
Fig. 3. Size of shielded pool compared to total supply of Zcash coins
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In Zcash, coins exist either in the transparent pool, where
they are controlled by a t-addr, or the shielded pool, controlled
by a z-addr. To determine the size of the shielded pool,
the difference between vpub_old and vpub_new of each
JoinSplit is calculated. This is the net differential into the
shielded pool. The total pool size is kept as a running sum
of the differential for each block. Our results (see Figure 3)
show that the shielded pool only ever contains a relatively
small percentage of the overall supply of Zcash coins4. For the
final block cataloged, the percentage of coins in the shielded
pool was 4.3%. The average percentage per block was 3.5%.
C. Discussion
Taken together, the previous results suggest an environment
where transactions using z-addrs are infrequently used. In an
environment where shielded transactions (i.e. z-addr to z-addr
and fully private) are commonplace, it is reasonable to assume
that many to most JoinSplits would contain no shielding or
deshielding operation. However, out of the 287,587 JoinSplits
cataloged, only 5,450 met these conditions. Furthermore, only
a relatively small percentage of coins are ever present in
the shielded pool. Together, these two conditions lead us to
hypothesize that when coins are introduced to the shielded
pool, they are soon returned back to the transparent pool.
Why are z-addr transactions so rare? We suggest that the
reason is likely practical: most wallet programs do not support
z-addrs. According to the Zcash community website5 no web-
based wallets support z-addrs. In addition, all cryptocurrency
exchanges that trade Zcash only accept t-addrs. For users that
wish to take advantage of the privacy features afforded by z-
addrs while still maintaining the practical utility of t-addrs,
a simple solution would be to send coins to a z-addr, and
then send them back to a t-addr. This would have the effect of
removing the linkability of the transactions. However, because
the amounts of the shielding and deshielding operations are
public, these types of transactions may still be linkable.
4For coin totals, only the whole number portion of coins are reported
5https://www.zcashcommunity.com/wallets/ accessed on November 1, 2017
IV. ROUND-TRIP TRANSACTIONS
In this section we use the public amount of shielding and
deshielding operations to build a candidate set of linkable
transactions that pass through the shielded pool. The official
Zcash website notes6 that such analysis is possible. However,
we believe this study is the first to perform the analysis and
show the prevalence of such transactions.
A. Defining
Definition. Let j1 and j2 be JoinSplits included in blocks
of height h1 and h2 with h2 > h1. If there exists exactly
one pair of transactions (t1, t2) with j1 ∈ t1, j2 ∈ t2, and
vpub_new(j2) = vpub_old(j1), then we say (t1, t2) is a
round-trip transaction (RTT).
RTTs are an ordered pair of transactions containing Join-
Splits where the shielding amount in the first transaction is
equal to the deshielding amount in the second transaction. In
addition, the second transaction must appear in a later block
than the first transaction. Lastly, we are only concerned about
those pairs where there is exactly one pair that fits the criteria,
e.g. if t1 shields 10.1234 coins, we are looking if there is
exactly one JoinSplit in any later block that deshields 10.1234
coins.
We note that although there is strong circumstantial evi-
dence that t1 and t2 in a RTT are linked, the conclusion is not
definitive. Not all RTTs identified by our heuristic are actually
linked; the match may be coincidental.
B. Methodology
To detect RTTs, we first modified an existing Bitcoin
blockchain parser to support Zcash. We then used this to
build a relational database of the blockchain, linking blocks,
transactions, and JoinSplits. Figure 4 gives the pseudocode for
a query to find JoinSplits that meet the criteria for RTTs.
Fig. 4. Pseudocode for SQL query to find potential round-trip transactions
SELECT *
FROM JoinSplits E,F
(
SELECT *
FROM JoinSplits G,H
WHERE G.vpub_old > 0
AND G.vpub_old = H.vpub_new
AND H.Block > G.Block
GROUP BY G.vpub_old
HAVING COUNT(G.Id) = 1
) I
WHERE E.vpub_old = F.vpub_new
AND E.vpub_old = I.vpub_old
6https://z.cash/blog/transaction-linkability.html accessed on November 2,
2017
C. Results
Our analysis found 10,075 transaction pairs that met our
criteria (see Figure 5), transferring a total of 919,220 coins.
The total number of all coins entering the shielded pool
was 2,911,734. Thus, we determined that 31.5% of all coins
entering the shielded pool were involved in a RTT.
We could not conclusively determine that all RTTs are
linked transactions. However, there is strong circumstantial
evidence that the false positive rate of our heuristic is low,
and that most of the transactions are indeed linked. 96%
(9673) of our matches involved transactions which appeared
within two hours of each other on the blockchain. In addition,
by the definition of RTTs, the amounts being shielded and
unshielded are globally unique amongst the entire history of
Zcash. Given the high divisibility7 of Zcash coins, we believe
that a single exact match of the shielding and deshielding
amounts occurring within a few hours is strong evidence that
the transactions are linked.
Fig. 5. Round-trip transactions by block time difference in minutes
∆ block time # RTT Σ coins
[0, 5) 1373 156,237
[5, 15) 5022 421,021
[15, 30) 1479 147,546
[30, 60) 1015 95,034
[60, 120) 500 35,741
[120, 1440) 284 60,518
[1440,∞) 402 3,120
Fig. 6. Top JoinSplits by vpub_old that are part of a round-trip transaction
Top n JoinSplits # RTT Σ coins
10 10 34,153
50 49 143,924
250 236 500,163
500 460 765,212
1000 585 834,301
Large denomination transfers were particularly likely to
be RTTs (see Figure 6). Of top 250 JoinSplits by shielding
amount, 236 were part of a RTT. Upon further investigation8
it was discovered that many of these large JoinSplits were
Zcash mining pools sending their block rewards to a z-addr
before distributing the coins to the t-addrs of miners. In this
case, miners may be under the impression that source of their
coins is private since they are receiving their payout from the
pool via a z-addr. However, because the pool is engaging in
RTTs, we were able to determine the t-addrs of the pool’s
members.
D. Fee-adjusted RTTs
When creating a Zcash transaction, the sender may choose
to offer a small amount of Zcash as an incentive for miners
7A Zcash coin can be divided out to 8 decimal places
8The t-addrs of Zcash miners are known
Fig. 7. Most common fees for non-coinbase transactions
Fee # tx %
0.0001 523,036 46.40%
0.001 34,203 3.03%
0.0002 33,662 2.99%
0.00009 30,400 2.70%
0.00005 24,127 2.14%
0.00000226 23,679 2.10%
0 16,154 1.43%
Fig. 8. 1-fee round-trip transactions
Fee # RTT Σ coins
0.0001 85 1,278
0.001 149 1,360
0.0002 143 1,400
0.00009 2 20
0.00005 9 20
to include the transaction in a block. This is known as a fee.
Although fees are not required, 98.6% of all non-coinbase9
Zcash transactions include a fee. Figure 7 shows the most
common fees. The fee used most frequently was 0.0001 Zcash,
which 46.4% of transactions used.
For RTTs, vpub_new = vpub_old. However, if the party
performs any shielded transactions (z-addr to z-addr) before
transferring back to the transparent pool, the vpub fields may
not match, since the shielded transactions may have also paid
fees. We relax our definition of an RTT to vpub_new =
vpub_old−f where f is some combination of common fees.
We call such transactions fee-adjusted round trip transactions.
For fee-adjusted RTTs we considered only transactions
appearing within 24 hours of each other. In addition, to limit
false positives only the five most common fees were used. We
first searched for 1-fee RTTs, which attempts to detect the
following pattern: t-addr → z-addr
fee
→ z-addr → t-addr.
Figure 8 gives the results for 1-fee RTTs. A total of 388 such
transaction pairs were found, accounting for a total of 6,058
coins. Given the apparent scarcity10 of shielded transactions,
it is unsurprising that relatively few were found.
We also searched for 2-fee RTTs, attempting to detect the
following: t-addr→ z-addr
fee
→ z-addr
fee
→ z-addr→ t-addr. We
considered combinations of the five most common fees, except
for those which summed to a common fee (e.g. 0.0001 +
0.0001 = 0.0002). A total of 485 transaction pairs were found,
accounting for a total of 4,411 coins.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Bitcoin’s transparent ledger allows the source and destina-
tion of coins to be traced by any third party. To prevent this
linking, Zcash employs shielded transactions to obscure these
9The first transaction in a block is the coinbase transaction, which specifies
the receiver of the block reward. Coinbase transactions do not have fees
10Recall that only 1.9% (5,450) JoinSplits have no shielding or deshielding
operation
Fig. 9. 2-fee round-trip transactions
Fee # RTT Σ coins
0.002 146 1,305
0.0012 131 1,264
0.0011 29 167
0.00109 0 0
0.00105 2 18
0.0004 137 1,316
0.0003 19 111
0.00029 3 30
0.00025 4 30
0.00019 7 80
0.00018 1 10
0.00015 3 40
0.00014 3 40
details. However, only transfers between two z-addrs are truly
private. Empirical evidence suggests that most usage of z-addrs
involves shielding or deshielding operations, where the amount
transferred is still public. We have shown that a third party can
use this information to link entries and exits from the shielded
pool. In our experiments we were able to identify 31.5% of
all shielded pool coins as likely being involved in round-trip
transactions.
When privacy features are optional, users often take the
path of least resistance. Given the large computational costs
of shielded transactions, they are relatively rare. Round-trip
transactions may be an effort to “have the best of both worlds”,
but if used incorrectly they do not deter a determined attacker
from linking transactions. To be entirely sure that the source
of coins cannot be traced, a user must perform a second,
fully shielded transaction after receiving coins in a shielding
operation. If they wish to return the coins to the transparent
pool, they must also take care to leave some portion remaining
in the shielded pool to avoid performing a RTT.
Lastly, we highlight a real-world case where RTTs can
lead to a serious privacy loss. Many of the coins involved in
RTTs come from mining pools distributing the block reward
proportionally to users based on their contribution to the pool.
Several of the popular Zcash pools perform an RTT before
actually distributing the reward. It may be that the pool’s
members do not wish for it to be known that they are engaged
in mining. By virtue of receiving coins from a z-addr, they may
believe that the source is obscured. However, by identifying
RTTs, the true source of their coins is revealed, which may
have serious repercussions.
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APPENDIX
A. Sample round-trip transactions
t1: a2c9f7ad3b1993c40e692da61966f8633d85cb96c07b8810c6b14493978f2b46
t2: ab3b717b85a64541c6d4bb2da8c0806da9666fa1979e0f640c7f49c44fea3bca
vpub_old: 3479.51898254
vpub_new: 3479.51898254
∆ block time: 2 minutes
t1: d4e0047df31d0e1c8a7d311064314a74c43d0677ffcc430f8d093bb1867dd21b
t2: b63f4948b405b91c28bd59affc06e12aa8e126cb1f101ab36e1114ee882bb0b3
vpub_old: 12.14981195
vpub_new: 12.14981195
∆ block time: 3 minutes
t1: a6c87c8e2f20b729a33fec7031b2ead3ec6a001e4aa4c575207c44f2690870e4
t2: 9f300ecfdfb6a8658f34bd469d74f401dd7233d7a610cb91faaeb4a2b3fdc299
vpub_old: 3.77326919
vpub_new: 3.77326919
∆ block time: 928 minutes
t1: 709e38ab58148f6b2a3eb56621ea502790270386b7c6648baf06a510cf48efaa
t2: 9f300ecfdfb6a8658f34bd469d74f401dd7233d7a610cb91faaeb4a2b3fdc299
vpub_old: 220.01805591
vpub_new: 220.01805591
∆ block time: 15 minutes
B. Sample 1-fee round-trip transaction
t1: 2641aeece9df50c5275b692a20da6f900a1a42440adc454765d7f3e6a1b1aeef
t2: 4d83b22ab6967c83f11e4cb6f417623c553364ddc5c8d658027356bc28fa6f1a
vpub_old: 0.67209594
vpub_new: 0.67199594
f : 0.0001
∆ block time: 8 minutes
C. Sample 2-fee round-trip transaction
t1: 84a11d9794e0eb318327dd960b7bfa4e1146855fcb1f0aaf6eb40ceadaf9ecbb
t2: 855e94b007d66f1ee283374c91b559d02fa397079d6f9b5b9012a668680efd71
vpub_old: 6.3805
vpub_new: 6.3794
f : 0.0001 + 0.001 = 0.0011
∆ block time: 35 minutes
